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Applying Intermediate Microeconomics to Terrorism 
 Students expect a microeconomics course to explore the behavior of consumers, 
producers, and governments in the marketplace.  What they find surprising is how far and wide 
the economic theory of choice casts its net in exploring human behavior.  In this article we apply 
the utility maximization model to terrorists’ resource allocation and targeting behavior and to 
governments’ counterterrorism efforts.  We also discuss selected game theoretic aspects of 
terrorism and counterterrorism.  In the conclusion we highlight the benefits of teaching the 
economics of terrorism in intermediate microeconomics. 
SOME BACKGROUND ON TERRORISM 
Definition 
 There is considerable debate among scholars over how terrorism is to be distinguished 
from other forms of violence, such as armed robbery or nation-state warfare (Hoffman 1998, ch. 
1).  For the purposes of this paper, we adopt Sandler and Hartley’s (1995, 308) definition of 
terrorism as “the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence or brutality to gain 
a political objective through intimidation or fear.”  By this definition, terrorism is fundamentally 
political in the sense that terrorists desire to “change the system,” something that is not a priority 
for ordinary criminals (Hoffman 1998, 42).  Unlike nation-states, terrorists operate outside the 
usual rules of warfare pertaining to civilians, diplomats, prisoners, and neutral parties.  Hence, 
terrorist acts involve extra-normal violence such as indiscriminate attacks against civilians, 
hostage-taking of diplomats, and execution of kidnapped military officers (Hoffman 1998, 34-
35).  Finally, note that terrorist activities are rich in externalities because they are designed to 
have psychological effects that extend beyond the immediate victims. 
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Historical Data 
 Selected annual series involving international and/or domestic terrorism worldwide are 
shown in Figures 1-3; underlying data are available Table A of the appendix.  The data source is 
RAND/Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (RAND-MIPT) 
(www.rand.org/psj/rand-mipt.html).  According to RAND-MIPT, “international terrorism 
includes incidents in which the perpetrators go abroad to strike their targets, select domestic 
targets associated with a foreign state, or create an international incident by attacking airline 
passengers or equipment.”  Examples of international terrorism are al Qaeda’s attacks against 
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 
2001.  Domestic terrorism is defined by RAND-MIPT as “incidents perpetrated by local 
nationals against a purely domestic target,” such as the fire set by the Earth Liberation Front in 
2001 that destroyed a building at the University of Washington’s Center for Urban Horticulture.  
RAND-MIPT has compiled annual data for international terrorism from 1968 and for domestic 
terrorism from 1998.1 
 Figure 1 shows the time paths for international terrorist incidents and for domestic 
terrorist incidents (divided by 10).  Three summary observations follow.  First, contrary to 
popular impression, no upward (linear) trend is evident in the international incidents series for 
the full sample period 1968-2003.2  Despite the notoriety of the 9/11 attacks in the United States, 
the number of international incidents is below the mean in five of the last six years in Figure 1.  
Second, domestic terrorism incidents around the world are much more numerous than 
international incidents, at least for the limited period of 1998-2003.  Third, there is a strong 
positive correlation between the number of international and domestic incidents, again for the 
limited period for which data are available.  Given students’ interest in international terrorism 
 3
and the limited availability of domestic terrorism data, the remainder of the paper focuses on 
international terrorism. 
Figure 1 here 
 Figure 2 shifts attention to casualties (deaths plus injured) and casualties per incident 
caused by international terrorism worldwide.  In contrast to Figure 1, upward trends are evident 
in both series, suggesting that international terrorism is increasing in severity.3  Particularly 
noticeable is the higher casualty rates since the end of the Cold War.  Enders and Sandler (2000) 
studied the increased deadliness of terrorism using time-series techniques and concluded that 
terrorist incidents since 1991 (through 1996 in their data) were 17 percentage points more likely 
to result in casualties relative to incidents in the preceding two decades.  They and other analysts 
attribute the increased deadliness to the growth in religiously-motivated acts of terrorism (Enders 
and Sandler 2000, 329-330; Hoffman 1998, ch. 4; Juergensmeyer 2000; for criticisms of 
“religion and violence” perspectives on terrorism, see Cavanaugh 2004). 
Figure 2 here 
 Figure 3 summarizes the frequency of international terrorist strikes against political and 
civilian targets.  While recognizing that all terrorist incidents by definition are fundamentally 
political, we classify terrorist attacks against governments, diplomats, or the military as political.  
Civilian targets involve strikes against airlines and airports, businesses, journalists, non-
governmental organizations, private citizens and property, religious organizations, transportation 
assets, and utilities.  Figure 3 shows that international terrorists in the aggregate chose civilian 
and political targets with roughly equal frequency during the Cold War years.  Since 1990, 
however, a greater frequency of civilian relative to political targets has emerged. 
Figure 3 here 
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RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL OF TERRORISM 
 The rational choice model can be applied to terrorism by assuming that individuals and 
organizations have preferences over terrorist as well as ordinary activities.  For most purposes, it 
is sufficient to carry out the analysis in terms of two commodities, terrorism T and composite 
good C, where the latter is defined as real expenditures on all goods other than T.4  Standard 
indifference curves can be used to show terrorists’ preferences over T and C, with T on the 
horizontal axis.  A relatively high degree of curvature of the indifference curves would imply a 
relatively low degree of substitutability between T and C.  If terrorists are particularly strident in 
their willingness to sacrifice some C to achieve an increment to T, they would have steep 
indifference curves in T-C space.  Non-terrorists receive no utility or even disutility from T, so 
their indifferences curves would be flat or upward sloping. 
 For some applications, terrorist preferences can be assumed over alternative targets, for 
example, political and civilian targets.  The lesser the curvature of the indifference curves, the 
more willing terrorists are to substitute among targets.  Regarding al Qaeda’s targeting 
philosophy, Osama bin Laden has been quoted: “We do not differentiate between those dressed 
in military uniforms and civilians. They’re all targets.”5  Taken at face value, the statement 
suggests that al Qaeda’s indifference curves over military and civilian targets may be virtually 
linear (perfect substitutes).  Horizontal or vertical indifference curves would apply to terrorists 
who are strictly motivated to strike one target class but not the other. 
 For general applications, we assume that terrorists have income I, which can be allocated 
over T and C according to the budget constraint I = PTT + PCC, where PT is the price (cost) of 
carrying out terrorist activities and PC is the price of the composite good.  For applications 
pertaining to targeting, we assume that an exogenous amount of resources RT are allocated to 
 5
terrorist activities.  The budget constraint then becomes RT = P1T1 + P2T2, where T1 and T2 are 
targets (e.g., political and civilian) and P1 and P2 are the prices of carrying out the respective 
missions.6 
 Assuming an interior solution, the utility maximizing choice of T and C occurs where the 
absolute value of the marginal rate of substitution of T for C is equal to the relative price of 
terrorism PT/PC.  Geometrically, this is shown by the tangency of the terrorist organization’s 
indifference curve to its budget constraint.  By altering the key parameters of the rational choice 
model (i.e., income, prices, preferences), various aspects of terrorism behavior and 
counterterrorism policy can be explored.7 
APPLICATIONS OF THE RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL 
Terrorist Access to Resources: Income-Consumption and Engel Curves 
 Terrorist groups are dependent upon financial resources to carry out terrorist activities, so 
they obviously strive to maintain or increase their income.  In Figure 4(a), assume the terrorist 
group has carried out a spectacular hijacking (e.g., 9/11) or hostage incident (e.g., 1972 Munich 
Olympics), which generates publicity and new financial support for the terrorist group among its 
sympathizers.  This shifts out the group’s budget constraint from aa to bb, which allows the 
group to acquire more terrorism and other goods.  The income-consumption curve in Figure 4(a) 
implies an Engel curve for terrorism in Figure 4(b), which can be used to explore the income 
elasticity of terrorism.  If the composite good, consisting largely of consumer goods like food, 
clothing, and housing, is viewed by terrorists as a necessity, then C would be income-inelastic.  
Because weighted income elasticities sum to one, this would imply that terrorism is income-
elastic, as reflected in the relatively flat slope of the Engel curve in Figure 4(b). 
Figure 4 here 
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 While terrorists attempt to increase their resources, governments, as part of 
counterterrorism policy, attempt to reduce resources available to terrorists by freezing or seizing 
financial assets and disrupting flows of funds associated with terrorist activities.  For example, 
the USA Patriot Act of 2001 expanded the power of Federal authorities to restrain money 
laundering via new regulations, criminal sanctions, and forfeiture rules.  In Figure 4(a), assume 
counterterrorism income policies reduce the budget constraint of the terrorist group from bb to 
aa.  If terrorism is income-elastic, counterterrorism income policies could be particularly 
effective in reducing terrorism.  Moreover, if terrorist activities generate publicity and enhance 
future terrorist fund-raising, counterterrorism income policies today could reduce future 
terrorism. 
Terrorist Response to Price Changes: The Price-Consumption Curve 
 In addition to income policies, governments attempt to thwart terrorism with price 
policies.  For example, greater defense of potential targets, attacks against terrorist training 
centers, capture of terrorist leaders, and infiltration of terrorist groups increase the price of 
terrorism PT.  Raising the opportunity cost of terrorism by making terrorist activities more 
expensive is classified by some scholars as deterrence policy.  In contrast to deterrence policy, 
Frey and Luechinger (2003) investigate the potential for “benevolence policy” to reduce 
terrorism.  A benevolence policy raises the opportunity cost of terrorist activities, not by 
increasing the price of terrorism, but by reducing the price of the composite good. 
 Figure 5 compares and contrasts deterrence and benevolence price policies to reduce 
terrorism.  Assume the initial budget constraint available to the terrorists is aa.  According to 
Figure 5, terrorists consume T1 in terrorist activity and C1 of other goods.  A deterrence policy 
increases the price of terrorism PT  by raising the expected costs of terrorist activity, causing the 
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budget constraint to rotate in along the T axis to budget line ab.  The increased opportunity cost 
of terrorism is reflected in the steeper slope of the budget line. Consistent with the law of 
demand, terrorist activity is reduced to some lower level T2. 
 A benevolence policy also raises the opportunity cost of terrorism, but it does so by 
increasing terrorist access to other goods by lowering PC.  This is shown in Figure 5 by budget 
line ca.  Again, the steeper budget line reflects a higher opportunity cost of terrorism.  Under the 
price-reducing benevolence policy, terrorists choose a reduced level of terrorism, which for 
convenience is drawn equal to T2, the same level as under deterrence. 
Figure 5 here 
 In Figure 5, the decrease in PC reduces terrorism from T1 to T2.  However, it is also 
logically possible for a decrease in PC to have the opposite effect and instead increase terrorism.  
This can easily be seen by redrawing the final indifference curve such that the optimum on 
budget line ca falls to the right of terrorist level T1.  The two possibilities are distinguished by the 
slopes of their respective price-consumption curves, which in turn are linked to different values 
of the own price elasticity of the composite good CCε .  In the case depicted in Figure 5, a 
decrease in PC generates a new optimum along a negatively-sloped price-consumption curve and 
hence a decreased level of terrorism.  This occurs if and only if the composite good is price 
elastic.  In the alternative case, a decrease in PC results in a new optimum along a positively-
sloped price-consumption curve and thus an increased level of terrorism.  This occurs if and only 
if the composite good is price inelastic.8 
Terrorist Substitution Possibilities and the Slutsky Equation 
 An important general issue raised by terrorism-thwarting price policies is the potential for 
terrorists to substitute into other activities.  For example, the question raised by consideration of 
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benevolence policy is whether terrorism will increase or decrease in response to a lowering 
of PC.  A similar issue arises when considering whether greater protection of political targets will 
increase or decrease terrorist attacks against civilians.  The scope of terrorist substitution 
possibilities is extensive.  For example, terrorists can substitute between terrorism and ordinary 
goods, across target classes, among weapons technologies, across countries, and over time 
(Sandler 2003, 794-796).  The rational choice model cannot by itself provide unambiguous 
answers to the direction and magnitude of terrorist substitution behavior.  It can, however, 
provide valuable guidance. 
 The guidance comes from the rational choice model’s well-known Slutsky equation.  In 
terms of elasticities, the equation can be formally stated for the case of terrorist substitution into 
activity i given a change in the price of activity j, εij, as: 
 ijijij ηασε −=          (1) 
where ijσ  is the compensated price elasticity of activity i with respect to a change in the price of 
activity j, jα  is the budget share of activity j, and iη  is the income elasticity of activity i. 
 When i=j in equation (1), standard income and substitution effects can be considered, as 
is done in virtually all intermediate microeconomics texts.  For example, if i=j=T, then one can 
evaluate the income and substitution effects of a higher price of terrorism on the quantity of 
terrorism. 
 When i≠j, the Slutsky equation can be used to study terrorist substitution across activities.  
For example, the Slutsky equation can be applied to the question above of whether a benevolence 
policy lowering PC would increase or decrease terrorism.  Let i be terrorism and j be the 
composite good encompassing food, clothing, shelter, etc.  The Slutsky equation decomposes the 
elasticity of terrorism with respect to a change in the price of the composite good into 
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substitution and income effects.  Recall from rational choice theory that not all goods can be net 
complements.  Hence, in the case of two goods only, T and C must be net substitutes.  This 
means that the substitution effect is necessarily positive (with lower PC implying lower T).  The 
substitutability between terrorism and other goods is presumably limited, however, implying that 
the substitution effect is small.  For the income effect, the minus sign on the Slutsky equation’s 
second term shows that a decrease in PC causes an increase in real income, where the increase is 
larger the greater is the composite good’s budget share.  Due to the minus sign, the sign of the 
income effect will be opposite that of the income elasticity of terrorism.  Both intuition and 
evidence (see Krueger and Malečková 2003) indicate that terrorism is a normal good such that 
the income elasticity is positive.  This, together with a presumably large budget share for the 
composite good, suggests that the income effect will be negative (with lower PC implying higher 
T) and large, possibly dominating a small positive substitution effect.  Hence, there is good 
reason to believe that the sign of TCε  is in fact negative, meaning that a decrease in the price of 
the composite good would actually increase terrorism. 
 The Slutsky equation can be applied to other terrorist substitution possibilities.  Consider 
Table 1, which shows the decline in hijackings in absolute terms and as a percent of international 
terrorism incidents following the placement of metal detectors in airports around the world in 
1973.  Table 1 seems consistent with rational choice theory whereby an increase in the relative 
price of hijackings was associated with a decline in the absolute and relative number of 
hijackings.  What about terrorist substitution possibilities into other modes of attack following 
the new constraint against hijackings?  Enders and Sandler (1993, 1995) employ time-series 
analysis to ascertain the effects of policies directed at inhibiting attacks on particular targets.  
Among their stronger results, they show that the placement of metal detectors had the unintended 
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consequence of significantly increasing hostage incidents and assassinations.  In terms of the 
Slutsky equation, this suggests large positive substitution effects across targets and at most only 
partially offsetting income effects associated with the increased price of hijackings.9 
Table 1 here 
Preference Policies 
 Although economists often take preferences as given and then focus on the effects of 
income and price changes on key variables, counterterrorist efforts to modify terrorist 
preferences are worth considering.10  Presumably the goal of counterterrorist preference policies 
is to make terrorist preference maps horizontal in T-C space, such that terrorists receive no utility 
from terrorist activities.  In the rational choice model, an important exogenous variable that 
might alter preferences is advertising.  Since terrorist preferences appear to be formed within a 
complex web of cultural, historical, political, and idiosyncratic variables, it may be overly 
optimistic to believe that counterterrorist “advertising campaigns” by governments could flatten 
terrorist preferences.  Nevertheless, there may be some important effects of advertising at the 
margin. 
 Consider, for example, the Iraqi prisoner abuse scandal of 2004.  It is likely that the 
degrading images of Iraqi prisoners hardened the preferences of terrorists against the United 
States.  It may have also created terrorist preferences among some individuals who previously 
had flat indifference curves in T-C space.  Hence, the prisoner abuse scandal can be seen as a 
form of “negative advertising” that may have reshaped terrorist preferences toward more 
terrorism.  The obvious implication is that counterterrorist policy should reduce the risk of 
catalytic events such as the prisoner abuse scandal or the accidental bombing of religious sites. 
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 “Positive advertising” campaigns can and do take many forms.  For example, 
governments are aware of regions of the world where terrorists reside or where the potential for 
terrorist recruiting is relatively high.  Some of these regions face a relatively high risk of natural 
disasters (earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.).  Extra-normal publicity of natural disaster relief by the 
United States in these regions might affect terrorist preference formation at the margin. 
 Of course, terrorists also carry out advertising campaigns.  Terrorist recruiters portray the 
evils of the enemy and attempt to convince people about the rightness of their cause.  Hence, 
governments and terrorist organizations can be viewed as engaged in an “advertising war” for the 
hearts and minds of people in strategic locales such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia.  In 
this advertising game, each side tries to gain “market share” by affecting what people know, or 
think they know, about themselves, governments, and terrorists.  The advertising game is just 
one of many dimensions of game theoretic interaction between terrorists and governments. 
GAME THEORETIC PERSPECTIVES OF TERRORISM 
 The strategic interdependence between terrorists and governments, and between 
governments themselves as they attempt to thwart terrorism, implies that game theory can be a 
useful supplement to the rational choice model in the analysis of terrorism.  In this section we 
selectively apply basic game theory to terrorism.  The applications that follow allow students to 
see a variety of concepts, principles, and games from intermediate microeconomics texts such as 
Pareto efficiency, public goods, externalities, backward induction (or rollback), and the 
prisoners’ dilemma. 
Government-Terrorist Hostage Game  
 Lapan and Sandler (1988) present an extensive form game showing the time pattern of 
choices between a terrorist organization considering a hostage mission and a government 
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deciding whether to negotiate for the hostages’ release.  The game tree for the hostage event is 
shown in Figure 6.  The government chooses deterrence expenditure, D, which we treat as a sunk 
cost.  The game tree begins with the terrorists deciding whether or not to attack.  If the terrorists 
do not attack, the status quo obtains with a payoff of 0 to each player.  If the terrorists attack but 
fail to capture the hostages, they endure payoff –L<0.  The government also bears a loss from a 
failed terrorist mission (e.g., loss of life of security forces, expenditure of resources), which is 
equal to –A<0 in Figure 6.  If the terrorists attack and succeed in capturing the hostages, the 
government must decide whether to negotiate with the terrorists.  If the government negotiates, 
the terrorist organization obtains a payoff of M>0 and the government suffers a loss of –B<–A.  
If the government does not negotiate, the terrorist organization receives payoff N<M, where N 
may be positive or negative.  When the government does not negotiate, it suffers a loss –C<–B.  
The probability of terrorist logistical failure is θ and the probability that the government 
negotiates given terrorist logistical success is p. 
Figure 6 here 
 From the game tree in Figure 6, the expected payoff Z to the terrorists from initiating a 
hostage mission is (Lapan and Sandler 1988, 17): 
 Z = –θL + (1–θ)[pM+(1-p)N].       (2) 
If Z>0, the expected payoff to the terrorists from initiating a hostage incident would be greater 
than the payoff of the status quo.  Assuming the terrorists initiate a hostage event and achieve 
logistical success, the rational thing for the government to do in a one-shot game is to negotiate 
with the terrorists (set p=1) and endure a loss of –B rather than the greater loss of –C.  The 
terrorists, using backward induction, can deduce that the rational play of the government is to set 
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p=1.  Hence, the terrorists can assume that the expected payoff from a hostage mission would in 
actuality be Z = –θL + (1–θ)M, which is greater than the Z value in equation (2) for all p<1. 
 The hostage game in Figure 6 is similar to an entry deterrence game, whereby a 
monopolist faces a threat of entry of another firm into its market.  The monopolist can attempt to 
deter entry of the other firm by threatening to increase output and lower price should the rival 
enter.  The problem for the monopolist is that, if the other firm enters, it is not in the 
monopolist’s interest to lower its price after the fact.  The potential entrant can thus dismiss the 
price-reducing threat of the incumbent as being not credible.  The equilibrium outcome in the 
entry deterrence game is for the potential entrant to enter and for the monopolist to not lower 
price (Varian 2003, 509-510). 
 The government and terrorists in Figure 6 are analogous to the monopolist and potential 
entrant.  One way for a government to deter a terrorist organization from initiating a hostage 
mission is to pre-commit to not negotiate with terrorists (setting p=0 in equation (2)).  Since 
N<M, the non-negotiation commitment of the government, if believed by the terrorists, lowers 
the terrorists’ expected payoff and potentially deters entry of the terrorists into a hostage mission.  
Just like the monopolist’s threat to lower price in the entry deterrence game, the government’s 
threat to not negotiate with terrorists calls for it to carry out an action that, after the fact, is not in 
its interest (–C<–B).11 
 In the entry deterrence game, the challenge for the monopolist is to make credible its 
threat to lower price upon entry of a rival, when after the fact, it is not in the monopolist’s 
interest to carry out the threat.  One way the monopolist can increase the credibility of its threat 
is to invest in excess capacity (Varian 2003, 510).  In international affairs, many governments 
adopt policies that pre-commit them to not negotiate with terrorists.  In terms of the game tree of 
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Figure 6, the pre-commitment policy, if believed by the terrorists, reduces the terrorists’ expected 
payoff from a hostage mission.12 
Counterterrorism Games between Governments 
 The hostage game above investigates strategic interdependence between a terrorist 
organization and a government.  Here we consider the strategic interdependence between 
governments themselves as they attempt to thwart terrorism.  Government efforts to thwart 
terrorism can be broadly classified as offensive or defensive.  Offensive counterterrorism 
encompasses attacks against terrorist training centers, bases, resources, and leaders; terrorist 
group infiltration; and diminution of a terrorist group’s ability to recruit members.  Defensive 
counterterrorism involves placement of screening devices and barriers in airports and buildings; 
risk-reducing protocols for diplomats, businesspeople, military personnel, and tourists; and 
security alerts for private citizens and civil authorities.  Although counterterrorism approaches 
cannot always be neatly classified as offensive or defensive, the distinction is useful because of 
various incentive issues faced by nations as they attempt to counter terrorism. 
 Consider, for example, offensive efforts to degrade al Qaeda.  The security benefits of a 
diminished al Qaeda network are nonrival (can be enjoyed by other nations at zero added cost) 
and nonexcludable (can be enjoyed by other nations regardless whether they contribute to the 
efforts).  Hence, degradation of al Qaeda is a public good for at-risk nations.  According to 
public goods theory, these nations have an incentive to free ride on one another’s efforts, which 
can lead to under-provision of offensive counterterrorism worldwide. 
 This quite naturally suggests modeling governments’ offensive counterterrorism efforts 
as a prisoners’ dilemma game (see, e.g., Lee 1988, Sandler 2003).  Assume in the attempt to 
degrade an international terrorist organization, nations A and B simultaneously choose between 
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two levels of offensive effort High and Low.  To introduce explicit payoffs, suppose that strategy 
pair (LowA,LowB) returns 0 to each nation.  Suppose further that when either nation increases its 
effort to High, a resource cost of 6 is incurred by that nation alone, while an added security 
benefit of 5 is enjoyed by both nations. 
 The result is the prisoners’ dilemma payoff matrix shown in Figure 7(a).  To understand 
the payoffs, suppose B chooses High.  If A also chooses High, then A enjoys a security benefit of 
5+5=10 but incurs a resource cost of 6, for a payoff of 4; alternatively, if A free rides and 
chooses Low, then A receives a benefit of 5 but incurs no cost, for a higher payoff of 5.  Suppose 
instead that B chooses Low.  If A chooses High, then A receives a benefit of 5 but a cost of 6, for 
a payoff of -1; if A chooses Low, then A receives 0 benefit and incurs 0 cost, for a higher payoff 
of 0.  Hence, A’s dominant strategy is to exercise a Low effort.  The game is symmetric and 
results in the unique but Pareto inefficient Nash equilibrium (LowA,LowB). 
Figure 7 here 
 The prisoners’ dilemma provides an intuitive explanation for the low levels of offensive 
counterterrorism effort prior to 9/11 (Cauley and Sandler 1988).  However, the also familiar 
assurance and chicken games might prove to be more useful characterizations of offensive 
counterterrorism since 9/11.  To illustrate the assurance game, again assume that a nation incurs 
a resource cost of 6 if it raises its effort to High.  Now assume there exist what can be thought of 
as increasing returns to offensive counterterrorism efforts.  If one nation increases its effort to 
High, an added security benefit of 2 is enjoyed by both nations, while if a second nation does the 
same, a further added benefit of 8 is generated. 
 The result is the assurance game of Figure 7(b), wherein a High effort is optimal only if 
matched by the other nation.  Suppose B chooses High.  If A also chooses High, then A has a 
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benefit of 2+8=10 and incurs a cost of 6, for a payoff of 4; if A chooses Low, then A has a benefit 
of 2 and no cost, for a lower payoff of 2.  Suppose instead that B chooses Low.  If A chooses 
High, then A receives a benefit of 2 and a cost of 6, for a payoff of -4; if A chooses Low, then A 
has 0 benefit and cost, for a higher payoff of 0.  Note now that A’s best reply depends on the 
strategy chosen by B, who faces symmetric incentives.  Here there are two pure-strategy Nash 
equilibriums (HighA,HighB) and (LowA,LowB), where the former is Pareto superior to the latter.  
If free riding is the essence of the prisoners’ dilemma, think of “I’ll try only if you help” as the 
intuition of the assurance game.  Sandler and Enders (2004, 310-311) suggest that the assurance 
game characterizes the coalition forged by the United States and Great Britain after 9/11. 
 There is, however, the suspicion that if the United States had found itself to be a coalition 
of one, it would nonetheless have increased its offensive counterterrorism efforts.  Thus, consider 
the chicken game.  Continue to assume that a nation incurs a resource cost of 6 if it chooses 
High, but assume now there exist what might be thought of as diminishing returns to offensive 
efforts.  If one nation increases its effort to High, an added security benefit of 8 accrues to both 
nations, while if a second nation does the same, a further added benefit of 2 results. 
 The result is the chicken game of Figure 7(c), wherein a High effort is optimal when the 
other nation chooses Low.  Leaving the confirmation of payoffs to the reader, note that the 
nations again have no dominant strategy.  As in the assurance game, two pure-strategy Nash 
equilibriums arise, in this case (LowA,HighB) and (HighA,LowB), which are both Pareto efficient.  
Nation A prefers the first equilibrium, wherein B contributes the preponderance of effort and A 
free rides, while B prefers the second.  The essence of this game is that each nation believes 
“something serious must be done” against the terrorists, but each prefers that the other take the 
lead. 
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 The prisoners’ dilemma, assurance, and chicken games as presented here are 
distinguished by the size and behavior of security benefits relative to resource costs.  Clearly, 
other games are both possible and plausible.  For example, if security benefits are sufficiently 
high, then both nations can have a dominant strategy to commit a High effort.  Or, to move away 
from symmetric games, if the security benefits vary between nations, one nation can have a 
dominant strategy of High while the other has a dominant strategy of Low.13 
 Whereas in the games above offensive counterterrorism effort by one nation can create a 
positive security externality for other nations, defensive effort against terrorists by one nation can 
create a negative security externality.  For example, greater defensive barriers in the United 
States could cause terrorists to strike at less protected countries, as implied by the substitution 
principle.  If nations’ ignore the negative security externalities of terrorism defense, the result 
can be a Pareto inefficient allocation of terrorism defense worldwide.  A variety of defensive 
counterterrorism games are possible depending on how security externalities and resource costs 
are structured in the game.14 
CONCLUSION 
 For applications in an intermediate microeconomics course, one can perhaps draw from 
no richer or timelier area than terrorism.  Virtually all features of the utility maximization model 
(e.g., Engel and price-consumption curves, substitution possibilities, Slutsky equation, etc.) can 
be used to explore terrorists’ resource allocation and targeting behavior and governments’ 
counterterrorism efforts.  Game theory models are also helpful in understanding the strategic 
interdependence between a terrorist organization and a government and between governments 
themselves as they attempt to thwart terrorism.  The natural interest students have in the 
terrorism problem can be leveraged to enhance students’ learning of microeconomics theory.  
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Moreover, students can better understand terrorism given the insights provided by 
microeconomic theory. 
 The microeconomics of terrorism also raises a number of broader methodological issues 
that students find interesting.  For example, asking students whether terrorists are “rational” 
usually leads to animated discussion, which can eventually be directed to various ways that 
economists and non-economists characterize rational behavior.  Hoffman (1998, 157) states that, 
“Contrary to both popular belief and media depiction, most terrorism is neither crazed nor 
capricious.  Rather, terrorist attacks are generally both premeditated and carefully planned.”  
Even though we might question the rationality of terrorist objectives, their methods of reaching 
objectives are rational in the common use of the term (i.e., premeditated and carefully planned).  
From an economic perspective, one can argue that terrorists are rational if, given their objectives, 
they respond to changes in their constraints in predictable ways (Sandler 1991, 13). 
 Another methodological issue that can be explored with students is the applicability of 
economic methods beyond the traditional boundaries of the discipline.  According to Boulding 
(1971, 255), “Economics is significant, ...not merely because it investigates an important slice of 
life in the market place, but because the [choice] phenomena which emerge in a relatively clear 
and quantitative form in the market place are also found in virtually all other human activities.”  
Boulding’s statement does not mean there are no shortcomings associated with economic 
methodology, but that virtually all forms of human activity are amenable to economic analysis.   
When students see microeconomic theory applied to terrorism, they can better appreciate 
Boulding’s point and arrive at a richer understanding of the role of microeconomic theory in 
exploring human behavior. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A here 
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NOTES 
1. Another well-known source of terrorist data is ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes 
of Terrorist Events), which uses information from print media to construct a database of 
international terrorism incidents from 1968-2003 (Mickolus et al., 2004).  ITERATE data are 
also available from Vinyard Software, Inc. (ph: 703-560-3939).  The U.S. State Department also 
publishes data on international terrorist attacks in the statistical appendix of its annual Global 
Terrorism Report (www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/). 
2.  A simple linear regression of incidents on time yields a slope coefficient of 0.87 (t = 0.80) and 
R-square of 0.02. 
3. A simple linear regression of casualties on time yields a slope coefficient of 76.2 (t = 3.58) 
and R-square of 0.27.  For casualties per incident, the corresponding figures are 0.36 (t = 3.26) 
and 0.24. 
4. On the composite good convention, see Nicholson (2005, 167-170). 
5. The statement was attributed to bin Laden by President Clinton in a speech delivered on 
August 20, 1998 (http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/WF980828/epf502.htm). 
6. In a more advanced utility maximization model, RT would be endogenous.  For example, a 
utility function over C and T could be posited with T in turn being a function of target choices 
(inputs) T1 and T2.  The terrorist organization would allocate resources, I, over C, T1, and T2 to 
maximize utility. 
7. Although the corner solution of the rational choice model might be considered idiosyncratic in 
most areas of economics, it may be useful in exploring suicide attacks (Sandler 2003, 784-785). 
8. The results described above follow from the budget constraint and the expenditures test for 
elasticity.  In the case in Figure 5, when PC is decreased, terrorists spend less on terrorism, since 
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PT is unchanged and T has decreased as dictated by a negatively-sloped price-consumption 
curve.  With fixed income, nominal expenditures on the composite good must therefore increase 
when PC decreases.  Because price and nominal expenditures move in opposite directions, C is 
price elastic.  Hence, a negatively-sloped price-consumption curve and decreased terrorism 
implies elastic demand.  Reversing the argument, elastic demand implies a negatively-sloped 
price-consumption curve and decreased terrorism.  Similar logic applies to the alternative case 
with a positively-sloped price consumption curve, increased terrorism, and inelastic demand.  
For further discussion, see Anderton and Carter (2004). 
9. Greater defense of airlines and political figures by Israel in the early 1970s may have 
contributed to the seizure of eleven Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists at the 1972 Olympic 
Games in Munich.  Fuad al-Shamali, one of the architects of the Munich hostage incident, 
described his substitution possibilities as follows: “We have to kill their most important and most 
famous people.  Since we cannot come close to their statesmen, we have to kill artists and 
sportsmen” (Hoffman 1998, 71).  In a similar vein, Enders and Sandler (2000, 380) warned that 
terrorist substitution possibilities could hurt the United States: “If a government responds by 
tightening security at official sites...as is currently being done in the United States, its civilian 
targets...will become relatively less secure….” 
10. Scholars from a variety of disciplines have delved into why terrorists exist and how they are 
motivated (i.e., how terrorist preferences are formed).  See, for example, Hoffman (1998) 
(Political Science), Hudson (1999) (Sociology and Psychology), Lewis (2003) (History), and 
Stout (2002) (Psychology). 
11. Given that –C<–B, it should not be surprising to see governments occasionally reneging on 
pre-commitments not to negotiate with terrorists.  For example, in November 1986, news media 
 22
reported that the Reagan Administration deviated from its non-negotiation pledge when it traded 
arms to obtain the freedom of three American hostages (Lapan and Sandler 1988, 16).  More 
recently, the Philippines apparently reversed course in its non-negotiation stance toward 
terrorists with the July 2004 pullout of Filipino troops from Iraq in exchange for a Filipino 
hostage.  This action seemingly contradicted President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s statement in 
her commencement address at the University of Mindanao on April 22, 2003: “There will be no 
letdown in our operations against the Abu Sayyaf and other terrorist groups as may be identified 
with firmness. And we will not negotiate with terrorists who are doing terrorists acts” 
(www.op.gov.ph/speeches.asp?iid=324&iyear=2003&imonth=4). 
12. For an extension of the hostage game in Figure 6 to a multi-period setting with reputation 
effects see Lapan and Sandler (1988). 
13. Another well-known game is battle-of-the sexes, whereby each player is better off when they 
pick the same action relative to the case where they choose different actions.  The game has two 
pure-strategy Nash equilibriums, but the preferences of the players over the equilibriums are in 
conflict.  Battle-of-the-sexes could be applied when, for example, one nation prefers a 
preemptive war strategy while another nation prefers sanctions and diplomacy. 
14. On various game theory models and issues associated with defensive counterterrorism games 
between governments, see Sandler (2003, 787-789) and Sandler and Siqueira (2003). 
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Figure 1. Worldwide Terrorist Incidents
 
Figure 2. Worldwide Casualties (Deaths+Injured) from International Terrorist Incidents
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Figure 3. International Terrorist Incidents by Target
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Figure 4. Income-Consumption (I-C) Curve and Engel Curve for Terrorism 
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Figure 5. Deterrence and Benevolence Price Policies to Reduce Terrorism 
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   Figure 6. Government-Terrorist Hostage Game 
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           (a) Prisoners’ Dilemma              (b) Assurance              (c) Chicken 
 
     Figure 7. Offensive Counterterrorism Games between Governments 
 
 
Table 1. International Terrorist Hijackings, 1968-1980 
 
 
Year 
Total International 
Incidents 
 
Hijackings 
Hijackings as 
Percent of Total  
1968 123 26 21.1 
1969 151 72 47.7 
1970 200 50 25.0 
1971 142 16 11.3 
1972 159 26 16.4 
1973* 170 11   6.5 
1974 218   7   3.2 
1975 194   3   1.5 
1976 274   8   2.9 
1977 210 20   9.5 
1978 193   9   4.7 
1979 216 12   5.6 
1980 206 22 10.7 
Mean              21.7 12.8 
* Metal Detectors Placed in Airports, 1973 
Source: RAND/MIPT 
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Table A. Terrorism Incidents, Casualties, and Targets, 1968-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Domestic 
Terrorism 
 
 
 
 
Incidents 
International 
Terrorism 
                                                                                                          Ratio of 
                                                                                                       Civilian to 
                                            Casualties          Civilian            Political          Political 
      Incidents        Casualties     per Incident           Targetsa           Targetsa           Targets 
1968  123 212 1.7 50 59 0.85 
1969  151 120 0.8 97 44 2.20 
1970  200 202 1.0 88 105 0.84 
1971  142 144 1.0 49 87 0.56 
1972  159 340 2.1 74 62 1.19 
1973  170 558 3.3 73 75 0.97 
1974  218 897 4.1 91 88 1.03 
1975  194 595 3.1 82 79 1.04 
1976  274 1,080 3.9 125 112 1.12 
1977  210 436 2.1 96 77 1.25 
1978  193 594 3.1 64 90 0.71 
1979  216 1,231 5.7 85 89 0.96 
1980  206 430 2.1 93 78 1.19 
1981  265 1,460 5.5 108 118 0.92 
1982  312 739 2.4 141 118 1.19 
1983  276 1,613 5.8 111 122 0.91 
1984  246 580 2.4 105 83 1.27 
1985  351 1,918 5.5 166 123 1.35 
1986  329 1,514 4.6 135 128 1.05 
1987  301 1,516 5.0 138 101 1.37 
1988  304 2,474 8.1 127 128 0.99 
1989  315 894 2.8 124 136 0.91 
1990  240 500 2.1 112 89 1.26 
1991  381 362 1.0 194 141 1.38 
1992  267 844 3.2 137 76 1.80 
1993  267 3,197 12.0 137 92 1.49 
1994  268 1,418 5.3 121 73 1.66 
1995  213 6,219 29.2 103 37 2.78 
1996  235 3,667 15.6 117 52 2.25 
1997  174 1,100 6.3 94 28 3.36 
1998 1,097 159 5,781 36.4 88 55 1.60 
1999 951 116 182 1.6 57 35 1.63 
2000 897 91 102 1.1 55 25 2.20 
2001 1,503 202 4,304 21.3 129 33 3.91 
2002 2,352 290 3,196 11.0 179 50 3.58 
2003 1,186 169 850 5.0 117 38 3.08 
      Mean   1,331.0               228.5             1,421.1          6.3                 107.3              81.3                1.55 
 
a Civilian and political incidents sum to less than total incidents because the targets for some incidents are not 
specified or are categorized as “maritime” or “police.”  Since some nations integrate their maritime and police forces 
into the military and others do not, we excluded terrorist attacks against maritime or police targets from the 
civilian/political tabulations. 
 
Source: RAND/MIPT 
 
 
